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Testing Economic Reality:
FLSA and Title VII Protection for
Workfare Participants
Benjamin F. Burryt

I. INTRODUCTION

Both the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") 1 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")2 provide considerable protection for low-wage workers in the United States.
This Comment explores how the two statutes have been applied
to welfare recipients required to perform work-related activities-such as training, trial jobs, and community service-in order to continue receiving welfare benefits ("workfare").
The existing workfare framework was enacted in 1996, when
President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility
3
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA").
PRWORA created a new federal program, Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families ("TANF"), to oversee government initiated
transfer payments based on economic need. Congress sought to
end welfare recipients' dependence on government assistance by
giving states, rather than the federal government, flexibility to
devise and administer the bureaucracy for such payments. 4 Under PRWORA, states receive block grants from the federal government to distribute to individuals and families, replacing the
system of individual determinations of welfare eligibility by the
federal government. In order for a state to receive federal welfare
grants, TANF requires that a certain percentage of the state's
5
welfare recipients participate in "work activities."
t BA 2007, Illinois Wesleyan University; JD Candidate 2010, University of Chicago.
1 29 USC §§ 201 et seq (2006).
2 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (2006).
3 Pub L No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
USC).
4 See, for example, 42 USC § 601(a) (2006) (enumerating the types of state programs
that will be given greater flexibility).
5 42 USC § 607(a) (2006) (enumerating the percentage required for different fiscal
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PRWORA specifically applies four federal nondiscrimination
6
statutes to all programs and activities receiving welfare grants:
(1) The Age Discrimination Act of 1975; 7 (2) Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973;8 (3) The Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990; 9 and (4) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10
FLSA and Title VII are not included.
The conspicuous absence of FLSA and Title VII has raised
contentious questions about whether and to what extent rights
afforded workers under FLSA and Title VII also apply to workfare participants. Since PRWORA came into effect in 1997,
courts have differed on how to reconcile the longstanding broad
applications of FLSA and Title VII with their apparent omission
from PRWORA. The unique duality of workfare participants, as
both workers and welfare recipients, has not made this question
easy.
Section II and Section III will consider the purview of FLSA
and Title VII, respectively. Section IV considers the two statutes
in light of recent federal courts of appeals decisions and finds
that there is a circuit split as to whether FLSA and Title VII apply to workfare participants. Section V shows that this circuit
split has been reinforced by federal district court decisions. Section VI then assesses the current state of the law, explores the
two statutes in light of their contradictions, and considers how a
consistent judicial interpretive philosophy can be devised. Finally, Section VII offers summary conclusions.
II. FLSA
For an individual to receive FLSA protections, which include
the federal minimum wage and overtime pay, that individual
must fall under the statute's definition of an "employee."1 1 FLSA
states that "the term 'employee' means any individual employed
by an employer." 12 An "employer" is defined as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency." 13 FLSA also
years).
6 42 USC § 608(d) (2006).
7 42 USC § 6101 et seq (2006).
8 29 USC § 794 (2006).
9 42 USC § 12101 et seq (2006).
10 42 USC § 2000d et seq (2006).
11 29 USC § 203 (2006) (defining terms used in FLSA).
12 Id at § 203(e)(1).
13 Id at § 203(d).
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states the term "'[e]mploy' includes to suffer or permit to work." 14
This is a circular definition, 15 and the Supreme Court has held
16
that Congress intended to enact a broad scope of coverage.
Courts have interpreted the definition of "employee" with reference to the remedial purposes of FLSA.' 7 Interpretation of a statute by referring to its remedial purposes is to apply the statute
in cases where its non-application is deemed to lead to the conditions that motivated the statute's passage. Correspondingly, the
remedial purposes of FLSA have been codified as follows:
The Congress hereby finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1)
causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities
of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several States;
(2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in
commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce. That Congress further finds
that the employment of persons in domestic service in
households affects commerce.1 8

2

14 Id at § 03(g).

15 See, for example, Marshall v Baptist Hospital,Inc, 473 F Supp 465, 467 (M D Tenn
1979) ('The definition of "employee" provided in the Act is virtually circular."), revd, 668
F2d 234 (6th Cir 1981).
16 United States v Rosenwasser, 323 US 360, 362-63 (1945) (stating that "[a] broader
or more comprehensive coverage of employees within the stated categories would be difficult to frame").
17 See A.H. Phillips, Inc v Walling, 324 US 490, 493 (1945) (holding that any exemptions from FLSA must be narrowly construed to this "humanitarian and remedial legislation," and giving due regard to congressional intent); Boucher v Shaw, 2009 US App
LEXIS 16555, *9 (9th Cir) ("[Tihe definition of 'employer' under FLSA is not limited by
the common law concept of 'employer,' but is to be given an expansive interpretation in
order to effectuate FLSA's broad remedial purposes.") (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); Antenor v D & S Farms, 88 F3d 925, 929 (11th Cir 1996) (considering the
statutory definitions of "employee" under FLSA and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act); Dole v Snell, 875 F2d 802, 804 (10th Cir 1989) (citing cases that
have adopted an expansive interpretation of "employee" under FLSA in order "to effectuate its broad remedial purposes").
18 29 USC § 202(a) (2006).
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Courts have held that the expansive definition of "employee" under FLSA extends beyond the common law agency test traditionally used for the employment relationship. 19 In its place, courts
have utilized the broader and more subjective "economic reality"
test to assess whether a putative employee meets the FLSA definition. 2 This holistic assessment considers the entire relationship between the putative employee and employer. 2 1
The Ninth Circuit's four-factor approach in Bonnette v California Health and Welfare Agency 22 is by far the most common
framework to guide applications of the economic reality test. 23
The Bonnette factors include whether the employer: (1) had the
power to hire and fire the employee; (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3)
determined the rate and method of payment; and (4) maintained
employment records. 24 The Bonnette factors have been utilized by
most federal circuits, including the Second Circuit. 25 It is important to note, however, that the role of the Bonnette factors is that
of a tool to help courts understand and apply the economic reality test. As subsequent decisions unequivocally point out, satisfying the Bonnette test is not an essential precondition to finding
6
an employment relationship.2
In sum, the definition of "employee" under FLSA has been
construed broadly, based on the totality of the circumstances of a
particular relationship, to give effect to FLSA's remedial purpos19 See, for example, Nationwide Mut Ins Co v Darden, 503 US 318, 326 (1992) (stating that FLSA's expansive definition of "employ" stretches the definition of "employee" to
cover parties who would not qualify under common law agency principles); Rutherford
Food Corp v McComb, 331 US 722, 728-29 (1947) (examining the definition of "employ"
and other words in FLSA to show an expansive interpretation of the word "employee").
20 Goldberg v Whitaker House Coop, Inc, 366 US 28, 33 (1966) (holding that under the
economic reality test, home-workers were employees of an embroidering co-operative
despite their technical classification by that co-operative).
21 Rutherford, 331 US at 730 (looking at the circumstances of the whole activity instead of isolated factors to find that meat boners were employees of the slaughtering
plant under FLSA).
22 704 F2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir 1983).
23 See, for example, Villarreal v Woodman, 113 F3d 202, 205 (lth Cir 1997) (discussing the history of application of the Bonnette factors by the courts).
24 Bonnette, 704 F2d at 1470 (compiling factors used by other courts to determine
whether the party was an "employee" under FLSA).
25 See Herman v RSR Security Services Ltd, 172 F3d 132, 139 (2d Cir 1999); Brock v
Superior Care, Inc, 840 F2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir 1988); Carter v Dutchess Community
College, 735 F2d 8, 12 (2d Cir 1984).
26 Barfield v New York City Health & Hospitals Corp, 537 F3d 132, 142 (2d Cir 2008)
(stating that none of the factors individually is dispositive, nor are they exclusive); Ling
Nan Zheng v Liberty Apparel Co, 355 F3d 61, 71 (2d Cir 2003) (denying that the four
factors are the "exclusive touchstone" in the FLSA employment inquiry).
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es. The four-factor Bonnette approach is the most common iteration of the totality of the circumstances analysis.
III. TITLE VII'S NARROWER SCOPE
Title VII protects employees from discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 27 As noted in Section
I, PRWORA omits Title VII from the enumerated list of nondiscrimination statutes applicable to workfare. Like FLSA, Title
VII does not provide much guidance as to which workers constitute "employees" protected by the statute. The definition of "employee" under Title VII is "an individual employed by an employer."28 Title VII differs from FLSA in that it does not define "employ" as "to suffer or permit to work." In this way, Title VII is
even more circular than FLSA. Courts initially struggled with
29
this definition and applied several interpretive tests.
The Supreme Court ultimately took on the issue and held
that the common law agency test should be used where a statute
defines "employee" in a circular way and provides no other guidance as to how to apply the term. 30 Specifically, the Court in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co v Darden31 held that such statutory language invokes the thirteen-factor common law agency test,
as summarized by the Supreme Court in Community for Creative
Nonviolence v Reid,32 to determine whether the worker is an
"employee." These factors are: the hiring party's right to control
the manner and means by which the product is accomplished;
the skill required; the sources of the instrumentalities and tools;
the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between
the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
27 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (2006).
28 Id at § 2000e(f).
29 See Cobb v Contract Transport, Inc, 452 F3d 543, 550-51 (6th Cir 2006) (declining
to adopt an Eleventh Circuit test for interpreting the Title VII definition of "employer"
that is very similar to the one used for interpreting the FSLA definition); Garcia v Copenhaver, Bell & Associates, 104 F3d 1256, 1265-66 (11th Cir 1997) (discussing different
tests used by courts to determine the meaning of "employer" and "employee" in Title VIl).
30 Darden, 503 US at 323 (applying the common law agency test to ERISA's definition of "employee").
31 490 US 730 (1989).
32 Id at 741-42 (1989) (discussing the various factors used by the lower courts).
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party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
33
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the party.
It is important to note that the Darden Court specifically exempted FLSA from its decision. 34 Because FLSA also includes a
definition for "employ" ("to suffer or permit to work"), 35 the Darden Court held that FLSA uniquely "stretches the meaning of
'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such
36
under a strict application of traditional agency law principles."
Thus, the statutory definition of "employ" has provided the basis
for applying the economic reality test, rather than the common
law agency test, to FLSA and the basis for interpreting "employee" under FLSA with reference to the statute's remedial purposes. 37 Since Title VII does not contain such language it is not
interpreted in light of its remedial purposes. 3 8 In sum, Title VII
invokes the common law agency test, which is narrower than the
economic reality test, and Title VII is not interpreted with reference to the statute's remedial purposes. Both FLSA and Title VII
were omitted from PRWORA, so whether and how each applies
to workfare participants is unclear. The discussion now turns to
the judicial resolution of these questions.
IV. APPLICATION OF

FLSA AND TITLE VII: JOHNS AND CITY OF
NEW YORK

This section first considers FLSA. In Johns v Stewart,39 the
Tenth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to address
whether workfare participants can be considered employees for
the purposes of FLSA. Johns built upon Tenth Circuit precedent
that, consistent with the discussion in Section II, defined FLSA
employment based on the overall nature of the parties' relation40
ship, using the economic reality test.
33 Darden, 503 US at 323-24 (adopting the common law agency test articulated in
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 US at 751-52).
34 Darden, 503 US at 326 (stating that FLSA's expansive definition of "employ"
stretches the definition of "employee" to cover parties who would not qualify under common law agency principles).
35 29 USC § 203(g).
36 Darden, 503 US at 326.
37 Id at 323; Frankel v Bally, Inc, 987 F2d 86, 90 (2d Cir 1993).
38 Id.

39 57 F3d 1544 (10th Cir 1995).
40 See, for example, Reich v Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F2d 1023, 1026-27
(10th Cir 1993) (holding that persons training to be firefighters did not constitute employees of fire protection district for purposes of FLSA); Dole, 875 F2d at 812 (holding
that as a matter of "economic reality" cake decorators are employees not independent
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In this seminal decision, Johns held that workfare participants in Utah were not covered by FLSA. The purpose of the
Utah programs was to provide immediate assistance to citizens
with pending applications for federal benefits. The plaintiffs argued they were entitled to the federal minimum wage, claiming
that they met the FLSA employment test because Utah required
them to perform work-related activities in exchange for workfare
benefits.
An important reason the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims
was that the plaintiffs participating in Utah's Financial Assistance General Assistance/Self-Sufficiency Program ("GA"), Work
Experience and Training Projects ("WEAT"), and Financial Assistance Emergency Work Program ("EWP") were obligated to
meet a number of requirements. They were required to "(1) meet
a needs test; (2) be unemployable, marginally employable, or 60
years old or older (for GA); (3) have no dependent children and be
able to perform a work project (for EWP); and (4) agree to participate in adult education, training, skills development, and job
search activities.."4 1 Furthermore, the plaintiffs applied for public
assistance, not state jobs. Although GA, WEAT, and EWP participants worked alongside Utah state employees at some of their
assigned projects, 42 there were differences between the plaintiffs
and actual state employees, including method of payment, taxation, absence of sick and annual leave, job security, and compensation. 43 These findings led the court to conclude that the overall
economic reality of the relationship was one of assistance rather
44
than employment.
As noted in Section III, courts have consistently interpreted
FLSA as carrying a broader definition of "employee" than Title
VII. To make categorical comparisons between FLSA and Title
VII, however, FLSA's economic reality test must be broader than
Title VII's common law agency test in all cases, such that the
latter is subsumed by the former. Case law and commentators
support this proposition. 45 Therefore, since Johns held that state
contractors under FLSA ); Marshall v Regis Education Corp, 666 F2d 1324, 1328 (10th
Cir 1981) (holding that resident hall assistants did not constitute employees of Regis
College for purposes of FLSA since the RA program was simply one component of their
entire educational experience).
41 Johns, 57 F3d at 1558.

42 Id at 1558-59.
43 Id.

41 Id at 1559-60 (noting that the plaintiffs did not claim an ongoing violation of a
federal right).
45 See Darden, 503 US at 326 ("[The FLSA definition] stretches the meaning of 'em-
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workfare participants were not "employees" under FLSA, a consistent judicial interpretation would require finding that workfare participants in similar programs are also not "employees"
under Title VII. That is, if one has not been "permit[ted] or suffer[ed] to work" by another, then they cannot be an agent either.
From a preliminary understanding of Title VII, this section
now turns to the application of Title VII to workfare participants.
In United States v City of New York, 46 four participants in New
York City's Work Experience Program ("WEP") sued the City for
sexual and racial harassment in violation of Title VII. New York
City's WEP is a work activity program under TANF. 47 The question before the Second Circuit was whether WEP participants
qualify as "employees" under Title VII, a necessary condition for
48
the plaintiffs' harassment suit.
The Second Circuit uses a two-part test to determine whether an individual is an employee under Title VII. First, an individual must show she was hired by the putative employer. 49 This
requires plaintiffs to establish receipt of remuneration for WEP
work. 50 To constitute remuneration, benefits must be substantial
and not merely incidental to the activity performed.5 1 Second, the
court applies the common law agency test to determine if the
worker is an "employee." 52 In City of New York, the court found
that WEP participants meet the definition of employees under
Title VII. 53 Of the thirteen common law agency factors, the court
placed the greatest emphasis on the first one: "the extent to
which the hiring party controls the manner and means by which
ployee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of
traditional agency law principles."); Richard Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an
Employee When it Sees One and How it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 Berkeley J Empl &
Labor L 295, 334, 354 (2001) (stating that the common law agency test includes "every
aspect of the economic realities test," and that the difference is that the economic reality
test fosters an additional inquiry into statutory purpose, and "statutory purpose nearly
always leads in the same direction: broad statutory coverage of economically dependent
workers").
46 359 F3d 83 (2d Cir 2004).
47 Id at 87.
48 Id at 86-87.

49 Id at 91-92.
50 City of New York, 359 F3d at 92. See also York v Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, 286 F3d 122, 126 (2d Cir 2002) (listing examples of such remuneration).
51 City of New York, 359 F3d at 92 (citing York, 286 F3d at 126).
52 City of New York, 359 F3d at 92. See also Reid, 490 US at 750-51 (citing Restatement § 220(2) while setting forth a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining
whether a hired party is an employee); Eisenberg v Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc,
237 F3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir 2000) (relying on the thirteen factors enumerated in Reid).
53 City of New York, 359 F3d at 97.
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the worker completes his or her assigned tasks."5 4 Under the
common law agency test, emphasizing a single factor is permiss56
ible; 55 however, no single factor may be dispositive.
Applying the common law agency test, the court in City of
New York held that WEP participants are employees because
benefits could be withheld from a participant refusing to perform
work-related activities in exchange for his or her welfare payments.5 7 The court recognized Johns, yet sought to distinguish
that holding on four grounds in order to avoid the otherwise inevitable conclusion that its decision created a circuit split. These
four reasons, as well as other aspects of the court's decision, were
58
subject to a vigorous dissent by Judge Jacobs.
First, the majority in City of New York pointed out that
Johns concerned whether a workfare participant is an employee
under FLSA, rather than Title VII. 59 As discussed in Section III,
however, the economic reality test is broader than the common
law agency test; since Johns held that workfare participants do
not meet the FLSA employment test, they cannot meet the Title
VII employment test either. Additionally, as the Supreme Court
has held, 60 participants in programs like WEP, which provide
training for a short period or offer closely supervised work to
promote training and rehabilitation, are not employees under
61
FLSA.
Second, the majority relied on statements by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regarding the purview of Title VII. Here the court emphasized that the EEOC-the
agency charged with interpreting Title VII-stated that a welfare recipient participating in work-related activities "will likely

54 Id at 92 (citations omitted).
55 See, for example, Eisenberg, 237 F3d at 114 (discussing the development of the
Reid factors).
56 Reid, 490 US at 752 (holding that the hiring party's control over the work is not
dispositive, and even though the hiring party retained control over the work, the defendant in this case was an independent contractor); Ward v Atlantic Coast Line R Co, 362
US 396, 400 (1960) (stating that the parties' characterization of the events was only one
factor among many to be considered); Hilton International Co v NLRB, 690 F2d 318,
320-21 (2d Cir 1982) (listing relevant factors to be considered and stating that no single
factor is determinative).
57 City of New York, 359 F3d at 92.
58 Id at 102-10 (Jacobs dissenting).
51 Id at 94 (majority) (distinguishing Johns).
60 See, for example, Walling v PortlandTerminal Co, 330 US 148, 153 (1947) (holding
that trainees for a railroad company are not "employees" under FLSA).
61 City of New York, 359 F3d at 103 (Jacobs dissenting).
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be an 'employee."' 62 Further, in an attempt to undermine the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Johns, the majority cited the Department of Labor ("DOL") compliance manual. In the manual, the
DOL-the agency charged with interpreting FLSA-stated that
welfare recipients would "probably not be employees under
FLSA."63
As the dissent pointed out, and the majority conceded, such
agency interpretations are entitled to no deference beyond their
"power to persuade." 64 The Supreme Court has consistently held
that the EEOC does not have the authority to promulgate Title
VII rules and regulations, and that EEOC interpretive claims
should be treated only as arguments to be considered. 65 The
same is true for the DOL with respect to FLSA.66 Thus, since
these qualified assertions by the EEOC and DOL about what
would "likely" or "probably not" happen are conclusory (in other
words, the administrative agency interpretations are unsupported), they correspondingly do not provide an adequate basis
for a judicial decision on the existence or nonexistence of an employment relationship under FLSA or Title VII.
Third, the majority attempted to draw a distinction between
the case before it and Johns by opining that the benefits offered
to workfare participants in the GA, WEAT, and EWP programs
were not as extensive as those offered to WEP participants. 67 The
Second Circuit argued that even if Johns did properly hold that
Utah workfare participants did not qualify as employees under
FLSA, the WEP participants in City of New York were differently
68
situated and thus could still be deemed FLSA employees.
Although this argument is logically correct, it is not supported by the facts in the two cases. The benefits that workfare
participants in Johns lacked in comparison to state employees
working on the same projects are also benefits lacked by WEP
62 Id at 93 (majority) (emphasis added), quoting EEOC Notice No 915.003 § 5.a (Dec
3, 1997).
63 Id (emphasis added).
64 Compare id at 93 with id at 109 (Jacobs dissenting).
65 See EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 257 (1991) (rejecting the
EEOC's interpretation of "employer"); General Electric Co v Gilbert, 429 US 125, 141-46
(1976) (rejecting the EEOC's interpretations of Title VII).
66 See Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 140 (1944) (holding that DOL rulings,
interpretations, and opinions regarding FLSA are not authoritative); Arriaga v Florida
Pacific Farms, LLC, 305 F3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir 2002) (holding that DOL interpretations are entitled to respect only to the extent they have the power to persuade).
67 City of New York, 359 F3d at 94.
68 Id.
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employees. WEP employees "do not receive the same salary, safe
working conditions, job security, career development, Social Security, pension rights, collective bargaining, or grievance procedures as do the actual employees." 69 Since it can be shown that
WEP participants lacked at least as many benefits as offered to
their counterpart state employees as the GA, WEAT, and EWP
participants lacked in Johns, the workfare participants in City of
New York cannot make a stronger case for an employment relationship than was made in Johns. Accordingly, there is insufficient factual discrepancy between the two workfare programs to
justify distinguishing the Second Circuit's holding from that of
the Tenth Circuit.
Furthermore, subsequent lower court decisions within the
Second Circuit support the view that WEP participants would
not be FLSA employees under Johns. Asked to consider whether
WEP participants constituted employees under FLSA, the District Court for the Western District of New York found the arguments in Johns compelling, yet decided that it was bound by City
of New York to hold otherwise. 70 Similarly, the District Court for
the Northern District of New York found Johns to be "relevant
and persuasive" when considering whether FLSA applies to WEP
participants, but understood itself to be bound by City of New
York. 71 The Second Circuit lower courts recognized that workfare
participants should not be considered "employees" under FLSA.
Both lower courts favored the same conclusion as the Tenth Circuit in Johns: workfare participants fall outside the purview of
FLSA (and thus, outside the scope of Title VII). The fact that the
District Courts in Elwell and Stone and the Court of Appeals in
City of New York 72 all considered New York WEP programs
strongly suggests that there is not a basis for the City of New
York court's suggestion that factual differences between New
York and Utah's workfare programs justify FLSA status for
workfare participants in the former state but not the latter.
Fourth, the City of New York court opined that the holding
in Johns relied upon an "artificial dichotomy," whereby an individual can only be a welfare recipient or an employee, while
Second Circuit precedent has recognized that one can permissi69 Id at 109 (Jacobs dissenting).
70 See Elwell v Weiss, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 96934, *13-18 (W D NY) (adopting the
analysis used in City of New York).
71 Stone v McGowan, 308 F Supp 2d 79, 86 (N D NY 2004) (holding that defendants,
as WEP participants, are not "employees" under FLSA).
72 City of New York, 359 F3d at 94 (distinguishing Johns).
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bly be classified as an employee in one respect and not another. 73
As the City of New York dissent pointed out, however, Johns did
not hold that a welfare recipient could not be an employee. 74
Here, the majority improperly suggested the false dichotomy.
The question in Johns was not, as City of New York suggested,
whether workfare participants, generally, should be deemed welfare recipients or employees. Instead it was whether the overall
nature of the relationship between the plaintiff-participants and
the state was one of employment. The court concluded that it was
not.

75

In sum, the Second Circuit offered four distinctions between
City of New York and Johns that do not hold up under closer
scrutiny. City of New York held that Title VII applies to workfare
participants after the Tenth Circuit had previously concluded
that FLSA, and thus Title VII, do not apply to similarly situated
workfare participants.
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT GROWS DEEPER

This section addresses the ramifications of the circuit split
noted in Section IV. Additionally, it will more carefully consider
the lower court decisions within the Second Circuit that were
introduced in the previous section. Subsequent decisions in
Second Circuit district courts have further reinforced the circuit
split between the Second and Tenth Circuits.
First, in Elwell v Weiss,76 a WEP participant sued, claiming
he was an employee under FLSA and thereby entitled to be paid
the federal minimum wage. Despite the Second Circuit's attempt
to distinguish Johns from its holding in City of New York by
pointing out that the Tenth Circuit considered FLSA rather than
Title VII, it is clear that this nominal distinction was not viable
in practice. In fact, according to the Elwell court, "the Second
Circuit's analysis in finding an employment relationship in New
York's WEP program is every bit as applicable and compelling to
Elwell's relationship with the County of Schuyler WEP program."77 Noting that the FLSA test is "considerably more inclusive" than Title VII's common law agency test, the Elwell court
73 Id at 94.
71 Id at 109 (Jacobs dissenting) (likening the case to Johns).
75 Johns, 57 F3d at 1558-59.
76 2006 US Dist LEXIS 96934, *4-6 (challenging the WEP's interpretation of "work
activities").
77 Id at*11
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held that "the Second Circuit's analysis in City of New York compels the conclusion that Elwell was an employee within the
78
meaning of FLSA."
Closer examination of the court's reasoning provides further
support for the conclusion that Title VII employment is a wholly
included subset of FLSA employment and City of New York was
therefore inconsistent with Johns. To determine whether WEP
participants are employees, the Elwell court first invoked the
economic reality test as "provid[ing] the appropriate guideposts
in determining an individual's status under FLSA."79 But rather
than applying the Bonnette factors,8 0 the court determined that
the economic reality test had been satisfied through inquiry into
the five common law agency factors used by City of New York.
The Elwell court's deference to City of New York's Title VII analysis as dispositive is so great that the court did not even attempt
to mitigate the Second Circuit's 'greatest emphasis' on the extent to which the hiring party controls the manner by which the
worker completes his assigned tasks."8 1 Courts conducting an
analysis under the economic reality test have been unwilling to
distinguish any "factor" as more important than another.8 2 The
Elwell court's use of common law agency factors where one is
distinguished above others demonstrates that the common law
agency test is considered to be a wholly inclusive subset of the
economic reality test; only such an understanding explains the
court's holding that the plaintiff is an employee under FLSA by
virtue of the fact that he satisfies the Title VII employment test.
If the Elwell court did not have such understanding, the court
would have been forced to step outside the common law agency
factors to consider the "totality of the circumstances" and also
decline to prioritize any one factor.
Elwell was not the only court to face a dilemma applying the
FLSA employment test in the wake of City of New York. Immediately after the City of New York decision, the District Court for
the Northern District of New York heard Stone v McGowan.83 In
78 Id at *18.

79 Id at *16.
80 See Bonnette, 704 F2d at 1470.
81 Elwell, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 96934 at *10.
82 See, for example, Frasierv General Electric Co, 930 F2d 1004, 1008 (2d Cir 1991)
(stating that no one factor is dispositive); Brock, 840 F2d at 1059 (stating that no factor is
dispositive and that the test is based on a totality of circumstances); Carter,735 F2d at 12
(holding that the lower court erred in giving undue weight to the control factor alone).
83 308 F Supp 2d at 86 (stating that the court was bound by City of New York).
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Stone, the plaintiff sued Oswego County for its administration of
a WEP, under which the plaintiff performed highway maintenance duties for the Town of Sandy Creek. The workfare participant claimed he was an employee under FLSA and thereby entitled to the federal minimum wage.8 4 Some defendants (in particular, the state commissioners) filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that a WEP participant is not an FLSA employee.8 5 After looking to precedent8 6 and then finding the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning in Johns to be "relevant and persuasive,"8 the Stone
court was tempted to grant the government's dismissal.88 The
court decided, however, that it was obligated to rule for the
plaintiff because it was bound by the Second Circuit's decision in
89
City of New York.
With due consideration of Elwell and Stone, the circuit split
created by City of New York becomes much clearer. Since 2004,90
district courts within the Second Circuit have struggled to reconcile City of New York with FLSA precedent. The result has been
that holdings in FLSA employment cases are even further at
odds with Johns.9 1
One source of confusion regarding the purview of employee
status under Title VII and FLSA is that the tests for both statutes are largely the same. Title VII precedent instructs courts to
ask whether a putative employee receives substantial remuneration, not incidental to her employment. 92 Courts then apply the
common law agency factors that are generally used to distin93
guish an employee from an independent contractor.

84 Id at 81 (stating that the plaintiff sought monetary damages and injunctive relief).
85 Id at 81-82 (noting that the court had previously denied the plaintiff's motion for

class certification to join past and present WEP participants for similar claims).
86 Brukhman v Giuliani, 94 NY 2d 387, 392-93 (NY App 2000) (holding under NY
law, not FLSA, that WEP participants are not employees within the meaning of the constitutional provision). Brukhman was distinguished by the City of New York court as only
construing New York state law. See City of New York, 359 F3d at 95.
87 Stone, 308 F Supp 2d at 86 (stating, however, that the court was bound to follow
the analysis of City of New York).
88 Id (discussing the textual analysis of the statute in Johns).
89 Id (noting that the Second Circuit subsequently suggested that it would have decided the issue in Johns differently).
90 See generally City of New York, 359 F3d at 83 (distinguishing Johns in 2004).
91 See, for example, Elwell, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 96934 at *13-16 (adopting the analysis used in City of New York); Stone, 308 F Supp 2d at 86 (adopting the analysis used in
City of New York).
92 City of New York, 359 F3d at 92 (citing York, 286 F3d at 126).
93 Darden, 503 US at 323-24.
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FLSA precedent condenses the analysis by instructing courts
to inquire into the economic reality of an alleged employment
relationship, considering the "circumstances of the whole activity."94 The economic reality test, however, is merely a more discretionary method of conducting the already very discretionary
common law agency analysis. FLSA considers five "guideposts"
in place of Title VII's thirteen. The primary difference lies in
courts' contemplation of FLSA's codified remedial purposes to
determine the breadth of the statute's employment test. This distinction originates with the Rutherford Court's suggestion that
the legislative history of FLSA intended to express a particularly
"broad" definition of "employ."95 In subtle contrast, Title VII,
when later enacted with nearly identical language relating to
96
employment, did not include this FLSA definition of "employ."
The current legal model has been to conduct these comparable analyses in a manner such that the economic reality test is
less stringent than the common law agency test; yet the extent to
which this is the case remains unquantified.9 7 This uncertainty,
along with the unique nature of the workfare relationship, is
what gave the City of New York court's assertion-that no circuit
split had been created-some plausibility before subsequent lower court decisions. In Darden, the Supreme Court provided clear
guidance as to the test applicable to Title VII and other statutes
using identical language. The Court indicated that the more
broadly applicable FLSA was not subject to this holding.9 8 Guidance on the applicability of these two statutes to workfare participants would serve the valuable goals of apprising participants of
their rights and enabling states to craft work-related activity
programs with an understanding of the duties incumbent upon
them.

94 Rutherford, 331 US at 730.
95 Id at 728 (noting that the expansive definition apparently originated in various
child labor statutes).
96 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (2006).
97 See Carlson, 22 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L at 343 n 277 (cited in note 40) (indicating that a random search of state appellate cases in which at least one judge dissented on
the issue of worker status yielded nine such cases in a nine month period).
98 Darden, 503 US at 326 (stating that FLSA's expansive definition of "employ"
stretches the definition of "employee" to cover parties who would not qualify under common law agency principles).
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VI. CONSIDERATIONS IN CREATING A CONSISTENT JUDICIAL
INTERPRETIVE PHILOSOPHY

Noting that a circuit split does, in fact, exist leaves us to
consider how a consistent judicial interpretive philosophy can be
devised. Such a philosophy should be consistent with the purposes of FLSA and Title VII; it should also reflect the interests of
the more than three million TANF recipients, the 138 million
United States taxpayers who fund the program, 99 as well as society as a whole.
With identical language to FLSA, Title VII defines an "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." 10 0 As noted
in Section V, the origin of the uniquely broad judicial interpretation of "employee" under FLSA has its roots in legislative history.
In particular, a statement by Senator Hugo Black has been used
to this effect. 10 1 The statutory language of the two statutes is only distinguished in that Title VII does not include a definition of
"employ" as "to suffer or permit to work."
The unequal treatment of these two statutes and encompassment of Title VII within FLSA appears to be neither mandated by the Senator's statement nor intrinsic to FLSA's additional definition. In fact, the more expansive definition of
FLSA-as compared to other federal employment statutes-is at
least partially based on its history as a derivation from child labor laws that sought broad application so as to assure children
would be prohibited from working, both as employees and independent contractors. 10 2 These justifications for a more expansive
employment test for FLSA than for Title VII have little relevancy
to workfare or the text of either statute.
Applying FLSA to workfare programs, however, does present
some concerns. First, one integral goal of PRWORA is to incentivize and facilitate non-working recipients of government transfer payments to ultimately obtain employment; this is achieved
See generally Internal Revenue Service, Data Book, 2007, Publication 55B (Mar
available at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07databk.pdf> (last visited May 2,
(compiling taxpayer data statistics for 2007).
42 USC § 2000(e)(f).
101 See Rosenwasser, 323 US at 363 n 3 (quoting the Senator's statement on the Senate floor that the term "employee" had been given "the broadest definition that has ever
been included in any one act").
102 Darden, 503 US at 326 (comparing the definition of "employee" in FLSA and
ERISA); Rutherford, 331 US at 728, 728 n 7 (noting the broad use of the phrase "employed, permitted or suffered to work" was found in child labor laws in 32 states and the
District of Columbia, as well as in several federal child labor laws).
99
2008)
2009)
100
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by promoting involvement in "work activities" so that participants can develop the skills and habits necessary for employment. 103 If FLSA were applied to state workfare programs, the
higher wages mandated would force the workfare programs to
increase payments to each worker and, correspondingly, to reduce total participants. This effect takes greater force with the
knowledge that TANF reforms required, by 2008, at least 70 percent work participation by each state's welfare recipients. 10 4 This
is a significant increase beyond the 25 percent requirement in
1997.105 Furthermore, recipients now must undertake forty hours
of workfare obligations per week, where no more than sixteen of
those forty hours may be training. 0 6 As a result, each TANF recipient must perform at least twenty-four hours of work activities per week; initially, workfare programs only required twenty
hours of work activities each week. 10 7 Moreover, in 2007 Congress increased the minimum wage. 0 8 Thus, applying FLSA to
workfare participants is much more onerous for state workfare
programs than it would have been in the past: the government
will have to pay a higher minimum wage to a greater number of
participants, who will all be working a greater number of hours.
There is reason to think that FLSA's goal of achieving
"maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers"'0 9 can be
best achieved by not applying FLSA to workfare programs. Without FLSA's minimum wage requirement, at least some workfare
programs in some states could lower payments and thus use
their federal funds to reach a greater number of unemployed citizens. If there is a diminishing marginal utility to welfare pay103 Pub L No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered titles of

USC).
104

See To Reauthorize and Improve the Program of Block Grants to States for Tempo-

rary Assistance for Needy Families, Improve Access to Quality Child Care, and for Other
Purposes, HR Rep No 4, 108th Cong, 1st Sess (2003) (revising annually mandatory work
requirements starting in the fiscal year 2005). See also Nicola Kean, The Unprotected
Workforce, 9 Tex J on CL & CR 159, 164 (Spring 2004) (describing legislation that would
increase the minimum work requirements for TANF).
105 42 USC § 607(a)(1).
106 Kean, 9 Tex J on CL & CR at 164 (cited in note 101) (describing proposed legislation that would increase the minimum work requirements and decrease employee training requirements for TANF).
107 See 42 USC § 607(c)(1)(a) (stating that in 1997, TANF recipients must participate
in 20 hours per week of work activities).
108 Stephen Labaton, Congress Passes Increase in the Minimum Wage, NY Times A12
(May 25, 2007).
109 29 USC § 202(a).
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ments, which seems most likely, a greater aggregate standard of
living can be achieved by allocating the last dollars now awarded
to existing recipients as the first dollars received by needy citizens excluded from the current program. In this case, a more
egalitarian dispersal of payments across the population of eligible recipients can be expected to improve the overall standard of
living.
To be sure, allowing workfare payments to fall below the
minimum wage will not necessarily produce the best results with
respect to workfare's stated goals in all scenarios. In some cases,
a small number of eligible recipients may produce great social
benefit when such recipients receive high payments; or a high
threshold level of payments may be necessary for an individual
participant to benefit from workfare. But when the workfare
programs designed by states are not constrained by FLSA's minimum wage mandate, states are less likely to be prevented from
creating the best set of workfare programs for their citizens: high
wages for a small number of recipients, low wages for a large
number of recipients, or any permutation thereof. Thus, unless
there is reason to think that state governments are not best situated to develop workfare programs that meet local needs, applying FLSA to workfare has dubious benefits since the effect is
simply to restrict states' options. Keeping in mind that a foundational premise of PRWORA is a belief that workfare is best administered on a state level, 110 freeing workfare programs from
FLSA mandates is in accordance with that goal.
The marked changes in PRWORA predicted to "end welfare
as we know it" ' included the limitations on how long recipients
may receive benefits and a notable shift of authority from the
federal government to states. The Second Circuit's decision in
City of New York suggests support for a public policy goal that
workfare participants should be entitled to protections of Title
VII and FLSA. If such provisions are best suited for workers they
may be most quickly, cost-effectively, and uniformly implemented into programs like WEP by state legislatures. A legislature can make findings, debate public policy, and make a democratic choice as to how to best prepare workfare participants for
full-time employment in the mainstream economy. Such an alternative may be more in accordance with PRWORA than judi110 See 42 USCS § 601(a) (stating that the purpose of block grants to states for TANF
"is to increase flexibility of States in operating [workfare]").
111 Joseph Lieberman, Welfare as We Know It, NY Times A23 (July 25, 1996).
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cial maneuvering to shoehorn workfare participants into federal
provisions largely designed to differentiate between workers and
independent contractors. PRWORA relied on a firmly held view
by the President and Congress that the states, rather than the
federal government, were best suited to establish, structure, and
manage welfare programs.
Second, it is worth considering whether preserving states'
autonomy with respect to workfare programs rather than applying FLSA is worthwhile because of the incentives such decisions
create for individual states. As touched on above, application of
FLSA to workfare may force states to discontinue assistance to
needy families in order to offset the higher cost of providing any
assistance at all. But since many states' TANF programs have
yet to be considered by a court with regard to whether FLSA applies, we should expect states predicting that the presence of a
federal minimum wage requirement will harm their workfare
programs will change their current programs to make FLSA coverage by judicial decision less likely.
Applying FLSA to state workfare programs occurs on a caseby-case basis because the economic reality test mandates such an
approach. States may work to avoid such a result by distancing
themselves from workfare participants; adjustments like providing less supervision, less training, less oversight, and less investment in workfare participants render the totality of the circumstances less akin to an employment relationship. Rather
than programs structured so participants accomplish the most
socially beneficial tasks and make the greatest improvements in
human capital, states may be encouraged to consider tasks that
will allow them to distance themselves from these workers so as
to avoid FLSA mandates.
Previous commentators have argued that FLSA should apply
to workfare participants because doing so would be consistent
with the statute's broad policy goals. 112 To the extent that such
application crowds out the policy goals of PRWORA, it is illadvised. PRWORA omits FLSA from both its enumeration of dis13
crimination statutes applying to TANF workfare participants
and from subsequent amendments adding protection under simi-

112 See, for example, Kevin Miller, Comment, Welfare and the Minimum Wage, 66 U
Chi L Rev 183, 184 (Winter 1999) (arguing that workfare participants should be considered "employees" under FLSA).
113 42 USC § 608(d).
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lar federal statutes. Thus, coverage of workfare participants under FLSA not only appears to be absent from FLSA's textual requirements, but also warrants consideration by courts as to
whether it may be detrimental to PRWORA's policy goals.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in City of New York the Second Circuit
creates, without acknowledgement, a circuit split with the Tenth
Circuit. Lower court decisions in the Second Circuit demonstrate
this point. When focusing on interpreting FLSA with reference to
its remedial purposes we find support, now more than ever, for
the Tenth Circuit's exclusion of workfare participants from coverage. So, although workfare participants stand to benefit from
Title VII protection, such an outcome by judicial decisions is unworkable. It would (1) be inconsistent with the existing understanding of the interpretive tests for FLSA and Title VII; (2) necessitate case-by-case implementation: a costly approach enabling avoidance by states; and (3) be inconsistent with the federalist premise of PRWORA. Furthermore, there are several policy
considerations that suggest such a sweeping expansion of FLSA
may not be wise.

